🇫🇷 🇬🇧 I. BIG OIL AND RENEWABLE ENERGY Big Oil is owned and controlled by big institutional investor funds. In fact, for each of the five oil majors often referred to as “Big Oil” (ExxonMobil, Chevron, TotalEnergies, Shell, BP), the controlling stock ownership is in no more than 25 of these institutional investors—not always the same funds, but with huge overlap.[1] Most of these funds (and families of funds) declare themselves to be “passive investors,” which means they supposedly don’t actively interfere in the management of the company, and supposedly robotically copy the components of an index they claim to be tracking, such as the S&P 500 (which contains the two US oil majors, ExxonMobil and Chevron, but not the others). S&P stands for Standard & Poor’s, “an American financial intelligence company that [provides] … investable indices, [such as the S&P 500] and credit ratings for companies…”[2] The “500” part of the index refers to the largest 500 US companies, not simply listed in the index, but listed by the total number of outstanding shares multiplied by their current selling price. The jargon for this is their “market capitalization.”[3] The institutional investment funds that “track” this index are set up by banks, such as JP Morgan Chase, or investment companies such as Fidelity, Blackrock, etc. Individuals or pension funds then buy these passive funds with the belief that they are then buying a slice of the entire stock market. The overwhelmingly held popular view, expressed even by major columnists on financial markets, is that the institutional fund managers are almost like stenographers taking down the dictation of the Standard & Poor’s index compilers—the popular view is that they must, based on the funds own prospectus, which is a contractual obligation to their own investors, i.e., the individuals or organizations that buy their fund, replicate their fund with the exact components and in the exact percentages as in the index. This supposedly allows the ordinary investors to buy the whole market “as is,” not as interpreted by a fund manager. So, no matter what the management of one of these 500 companies does that the fund manager thinks is bad for the holders of the fund, the fund manager supposedly can’t sell the stock. This myth simply does not square with reality; the fund managers can and do sometimes sell the shares of the individual companies in the index. The details are described in a meticulously researched, 2024, detailed analysis in the Yale Journal on Regulation, which bills itself as “The Nation’s Top-Ranked Administrative Law and Corporate Law Journal.” According to the article, “Discretionary Investing by ‘Passive’ S&P 500 Funds,” by Peter Molk and Adriana Robertson, “Common language [in the fund’s prospectus] like holding 80 % of assets in S&P 500 companies gives [passive] index funds considerable flexibility in their investment decisions.” [4] This means the tracking fund doesn’t promise, i.e., isn’t legally committed, to replicate 100 % of the S&P 500, only 80 %; they could sell the Big Oil companies (or others) and not be in violation of their contractual commitments. In other words, holders of the fund could not successfully sue the fund for misleading them by selling ExxonMobil or Chevron. On some funds, the managers have even more wiggle room. The same article notes that many funds, including major ones, use sampling to replicate the reference index : “Fidelity’s S&P 500 fund, for instance, states that “the fund may not always hold all of the same securities as the S&P 500® Index’ and that it ‘may use statistical sampling techniques to attempt to replicate the returns of the index”. This means that the fund managers’ legal, contractual, commitment is not to provide a carbon copy of the index, but to use only some of the stocks in the index to attempt to provide at least as much money, in the form of stock appreciation and dividends, as a total carbon copy of the index might provide. These two types of wiggle room (80 % and sampling) are precisely how the various funds from the rival institutions compete with each other by offering rival S&P 500 funds. How much do the holdings vary from the index? According to the article, “…even among the largest S&P 500 funds, holdings differed from the index by a total of between 1.7 % and 7.5 % in the fourth quarter of 2022.” ExxonMobil, weighted by market capitalization on the S&P 500 index constitutes 0.87 % of the index. Chevron constitutes 0.53 %.[5] Together they make up 1.4 % of the index. With these percentages, a fund manager could certainly reduce its holdings in ExxonMobil and Chevron, even sell all of their holdings in them, and still meet the proclaimed requirement of the fund. So, passive or not, the fund manager’s control still remains the implicit ability to sell the stock. They don’t sell if the company serves their purpose—to provide an adequate dividend return and maintain the stock price. The funds will keep holding the stock if they simply get their share of the “free cash flow,” defined by a common source, Investopedia, as “The cash a company generates after accounting for cash outflows to support operations and maintain its capital assets.”[6] The extra money then goes into dividends, special dividends, and stock buybacks. From Big Oil, when the companies overwhelmingly stay in oil, the funds get their money. Here’s an analysis of ExxonMobil from a common source, Investing.com : “… the 3.3 %+ dividend plus buybacks north of $20B per year create an embedded return floor… [ExxonMobil] at current levels and with current data, deserves a clear, data-backed rating : it is a BUY rather than a Hold or a Sell.”[7] This analysis illustrates why Big Oil won’t go into renewable energy in a big way; the controlling funds simply want all of their proportion of the available, extra cash. So, of course, do the hundreds of thousands of small investors, and the smaller institutional investor funds. But if some of the

Par Bell R.

14 mars 2026

🇫🇷 🇬🇧 Par Robert I. Bell, Professeur de management au Brooklyn College, City University of New York Résumé Dans un contexte où les grandes entreprises pétrolières mondiales sont dominées par une petite poignée d’investisseurs institutionnels, une réforme fiscale ambitieuse, mêlant crédit d’impôt et taxation différentielle des rachats d’action, pourrait jouer un rôle essentiel dans la redirection de leurs investissements vers les énergies renouvelables. Les cinq plus grandes entreprises pétrolières mondiales — Exxon, Chevron, TotalEnergies, BP et Shell — sont aujourd’hui contrôlées par un nombre restreint d’investisseurs institutionnels : 25 au total, détenant entre 38 % et 50 % de leurs actions [1]. Bien que ces investisseurs varient, on observe une forte homogénéité parmi eux, avec la présence systématique de grands noms tels que BlackRock, JP Morgan Chase et Vanguard. De ce fait, un petit groupe d’investisseurs domine de manière effective l’industrie pétrolière mondiale, et les dirigeants de ces entreprises œuvrent en priorité pour satisfaire leurs intérêts. Pourquoi cette concentration pose-t-elle problème ? Influence politique excessive Tout d’abord, ces géants pétroliers exercent une influence politique considérable à l’échelle mondiale. Un exemple récent l’illustre bien : en avril 2024, Donald Trump a organisé un dîner avec une vingtaine de dirigeants de l’industrie pétrolière dans son domaine en Floride, leur demandant un milliard de dollars pour financer sa campagne présidentielle [2]. En retour, il a promis de supprimer l’Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) de Joe Biden ainsi que d’autres mesures visant à limiter le réchauffement climatique et à réduire la pollution. Trump, quel que soit son niveau d’intelligence, sait où se trouve l’argent et l’influence qu’il peut acheter. Obstacle à la transition vers les énergies renouvelables Cette structure de propriété empêche ensuite les grandes compagnies pétrolières de se reconvertir vers les énergies renouvelables. Bien que certains des 25 investisseurs puissent être des idéologues néolibéraux, la plupart d’entre eux ne poursuivent qu’un seul objectif : maximiser les profits de leurs actionnaires. Les compagnies pétrolières leur offrent une source de profits régulière et importante. Les véhicules, avions, navires et produits pétrochimiques — notamment le plastique — assurent à l’industrie pétrolière des bénéfices presque garantis. Et lorsque ces bénéfices ne suffisent pas, les compagnies rachètent leurs propres actions et versent des dividendes généreux, souvent à titre exceptionnel. Par conséquent, seule une très faible part des bénéfices générés par ces entreprises est réinvestie dans les énergies renouvelables. Personne n’a besoin d’être un idéologue pour que ce système perdure : les cadres supérieurs de ces entreprises préservent leur emploi en travaillant pour les actionnaires (c’est-à-dire les 25) et les actionnaires (c’est-à-dire les 25) travaillent simplement pour leurs investisseurs. En d’autres termes, chacun est responsable devant quelqu’un d’autre et a une bonne raison de ne pas se préoccuper du tableau d’ensemble. Absence de volonté de lutte contre le réchauffement climatique Ces investisseurs ne semblent pas non plus préoccupés par la crise climatique immédiate. Heather Zichal, responsable mondial du développement durable chez JPMorgan Chase & Co, l’un des principaux actionnaires de ces géants, l’a confirmé dans une interview accordée à Bloomberg lors de la semaine du climat en septembre 2024 : « Nous nous concentrons sur ce que nous pouvons contrôler, à savoir maximiser le rendement du capital » [3]. Plutôt que de réorienter leurs investissements vers les énergies renouvelables, ces institutions préfèrent continuer à canaliser les flux de trésorerie des entreprises pétrolières vers leurs portefeuilles d’actions, contribuant ainsi à l’immobilisme de ces structures. Potentiel des Supermajors pour la transition énergétique Cela est d’autant plus regrettable que les supermajors disposent des ressources et des compétences nécessaires pour contribuer à la lutte contre le réchauffement climatique, notamment grâce à leur expertise dans les technologies offshores, qui pourraient être utilisées pour développer des parcs éoliens flottants. Cependant, des entreprises comme Equinor ont malheureusement utilisé cette expertise pour continuer à exploiter le pétrole en mer, masquant ainsi un greenwashing déguisé [4]. D’autres entreprises, comme Orsted [5], ont choisi une voie plus radicale en se reconvertissant vers les énergies renouvelables, mais ces efforts restent isolés. Il convient d’ailleurs de souligner que si Orsted est détenue majoritairement par le gouvernement danois, Equinor est détenue à 67 % par le gouvernement norvégien. Les recettes du gouvernement norvégien provenant d’Equinor sont ainsi reversées au fonds de pension gouvernemental (Government Pension Fund Global), géré par la Norge Bank. Son site web indique que « ces dépôts représentent moins de la moitié de la valeur du fonds. La majeure partie a été gagnée en investissant dans des actions, des titres à revenu fixe, des biens immobiliers et des infrastructures d’énergie renouvelable » [6] [7]. Cela dit, le fonds, outre les revenus qu’il tire du pétrole et du gaz naturel norvégiens, détient des parts importantes dans Shell, TotalEnergies, Chevron et Exxon [8]. Ainsi, si le pays a su éviter la « malédiction du pétrole » en réinvestissant une partie de ses profits dans des infrastructures durables, une part importante de ses revenus conduit à propager les effets néfastes du réchauffement climatique à l’échelle mondiale. Le gouvernement norvégien ne semble pas pressé de faire évoluer cet état de fait. Que faire ? Le système financier mondial est si inertiel que toute tentative de s’attaquer à la concentration de la propriété des entreprises pétrolières, ou à la question des « 25 » actionnaires, semble presque irréalisable à première vue. Les mouvements de désinvestissement ont tenté d’aborder cette question sous un angle moral, mais sans grand succès. Une approche plus pragmatique, qui considérerait la question sous l’angle financier et fiscal, pourrait-elle être plus efficace ? L’objectif ne devrait en effet peut-être pas être de faire sortir les investisseurs du pétrole, mais de faire sortir les compagnies pétrolières elles-mêmes du pétrole. La taxe sur le rachat d’actions : effet Robin des Bois ou piège fiscal ? La réaction des gilets jaunes à une taxe sur le diesel nous a appris qu’une taxe ciblée sur le carbone, qui peut être facilement présentée comme frappant de manière disproportionnée ceux qui se considèrent comme des pauvres, est une très mauvaise idée sur le plan politique. En revanche, une taxe sur les

Par Bell R.

28 novembre 2024

🇫🇷 🇬🇧 By Robert I. Bell Professor of Management at Brooklyn College, City University of New York Each of five oil Supermajors- EXXON, Chevron, TotalEnergies, BP, and Shell — is controlled by only 25 institutional investors, holding between 38% and 50% of the stock. They aren’t always the same 25, but there is tremendous overlap, with US firms Blackrock, JP Morgan Chase, and Vanguard always in each ownership cabal.[1] Thus a handful of essentially the same owners effectively control the world’s oil industry. Since the 25, or even a material percentage of them, could easily break top management simply by agreeing among themselves to dump the shares, it is hard to imagine that top management is not focused on them and what they want. What would be a good response to effective control of the oil supermajors by 25 institutional shareholders each? Why is the handful of owners a problem? First, these oil companies exercise enormous political influence, globally. Although this is well documented, a recent event perfectly illustrates it. Donald Trump gathered some two dozen top oil executives for dinner at his Florida estate in April of this year and asked for $1 Billion in Presidential campaign contributions; if elected, he would throw out Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act and other efforts to stop global warming and environmental pollution. Whatever else Trump may or may not know, he does know where the money is, and the political influence it can buy.[2] Second, this ownership structure is, in my opinion, literally preventing the oil majors from transforming into renewable energy companies. Although some of the 25 Fund managers may be right-wing ideologues, most of them probably have more or less only one interest—raking in for “the shareholders,” i.e., their funds, all the money generated by the oil companies not needed to pay their bills or drill more holes to maintain their oil reserves. The oil companies represent a more or less sure source of money; all those cars, trucks, airplanes and ships burning some product extracted from oil, and all those items in the petro-chemical industry, especially plastic, make oil as close to a sure-thing as there is. The oil supermajors guarantee this sure-thing by constant share buybacks to keep up the stock price as best as they can in the face of unstable oil prices, and pay out fat dividends, sometimes special dividends. So very little of the free cash generated by the oil sure-thing goes into renewable energy. Please note, nobody needs to be a crazy ideologue or greedy monster for this to be true; top management simply preserves their jobs by delivering for the shareholders (i.e., the 25) and the shareholders (i.e., the 25) are simply delivering for their investors. In other words, everybody is simply being responsible to somebody else. Third, these financial owners apparently are not focused on saving the world from the immediate crisis of global warming, if we look at the implications of the words of Heather Zichal, Global Head of Sustainability at JPMorgan Chase & Co, one of the 25 controlling shareholders in each of the five Supermajors: “There are a lot of things that we, as a bank, can control, but there are things that we can’t…We’re focused on what we can control—facilitating capital,” she said in a Bloomberg interview during Climate Week in September, 2024 in New York City.[3] As we have seen, her bank, along with another 24 institutional investors, are facilitating their capital into the controlling stake in oil stocks, and the oil companies are then handing essentially all their free cash flow to these owners, instead of using a material part of it to convert out of oil and into renewable energy. Fourth, the oil Supermajors are in a spectacular position to help save the world from global warming by converting to or materially contributing to renewable energy—they have much of the offshore knowledge and even equipment to create huge fleets of floating wind turbines. One, not a Supermajor, but a big company nonetheless, Equinor, has actually started to do that—regrettably in order to produce more offshore oil![4] So this is either a significant green move for an oil company or very high-end greenwash. Another, also not a Supermajor, Danish Oil and Natural Gas, changed its name to Orsted, and is now the world’s biggest developer of offshore wind farms. Perhaps not incidentally, on October 7, 2024, Equinor announced it was buying nearly 10% of Orsted, but would not seek any management changes or board seats and it supported Orsted’s current strategy.[5] Orsted is majority owned by the Danish government. Equinor is 67% owned by the Norwegian government. The Norwegian government’s revenue from Equinor goes into the Government Pension Fund Global, run by Norge Bank. Their website states, “these deposits account for less than half the value of the fund. Most of it has been earned by investing in equities, fixed income, real estate and renewable energy infrastructure.”[6] The fund helps to finance a very successful, egalitarian social welfare state.[7] That said, the Fund, in addition to its revenue from Norwegian oil and natural gas, owns material percentages of Shell, TotalEnergies, Chevron, and Exxon.[8] So, although the fund helps to make Norway perhaps the only country in the world to escape “the curse of oil,” it also helps to inflict the curse of global warming on the rest of us, and themselves. What should be done about this? There is so much inertia in the global financial system that any idea of addressing the concentration of ownership, the issue of the 25 itself, however bad it may be, is likely a fantasy. The divestiture movement has addressed this issue of ownership, but as a moral issue, and regrettably without great success. Can it be more successful if it is made a financial one? Maybe the goal should not be to get the investors out of oil, but to get the oil companies themselves out of oil. The stock buyback tax has a Robin Hood effect, but with problems We know from the gilet jaune response to a tax on diesel, that

Par Bell R.

27 novembre 2024